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IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICI
This brief of amici curiae is submitted on behalf of the following
individuals (affiliations are for identification only):
Prof. Roger Allan Ford, University of New Hampshire Franklin
Pierce School of Law
Prof. Yvette Joy Liebesman, Saint Louis University School of Law
Prof. Phil Malone, Juelsgaard Intellectual Property and Innovation
Clinic, Stanford Law School
Prof. Connie Davis Nichols, Baylor Law
Riana Pfefferkorn, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law
School
Prof. Rebecca Tushnet, Harvard Law School
Prof. Jonathan Weinberg, Wayne State University Law School
Amici are cybersecurity law professors and scholars who teach
and write about the threats facing businesses and consumers online and
how to combat those threats. Amici write to express their concerns
about how the panel decision will benefit malefactors and undermine
cybersecurity. Unless the Court corrects the panel decision, the amici
are concerned that the decision will make the Internet less safe.

1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The panel or the Court en banc should rehear this case so that it
can reevaluate the ruling’s consequences for cybersecurity. Though anticompetitive animus could be a troubling reason for one software
program to block another, the Court’s decision overcorrects for this
concern. The panel decision will foster spurious legal accusations of
anti-competitive blocking of software programs that are, in fact,
dangerous to businesses and consumers. These legal threats will hinder
the ability of anti-threat software vendors to properly classify threats to
businesses and consumers, which will make the Internet less safe for
everyone.
II.

ARGUMENT

Businesses and consumers rely on third-party software to protect
their computing devices from external threats. We refer to these thirdparty software providers as “anti-threat software vendors.” The threats
they manage include:
 Malicious software (“malware”), including spyware, ransomware,
and viruses.
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 Software that is not inherently pernicious but nevertheless may
cause problems for users, sometimes called “Potentially Unwanted
Programs” or “PUPs.” These programs are also sometimes called
“crapware” and can include adware and “bloatware.”
 Unwanted content, such as spam or objectionable content.
Without robust anti-threat software, businesses and consumers
would be overrun by threats that would render their computing devices
unusable and expose them to financial, physical, and other risks. Any
legal or regulatory scheme that undermines the ability of anti-threat
software vendors to protect consumers and businesses poses a major
threat to the Internet’s integrity. See generally Roger Allan Ford, Data
Scams, 57 HOUSTON L. REV. 111 (2019) (discussing the vital role that
intermediaries play in combating online threats).
A.

The Importance of Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s Safe Harbor
For more than two decades, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) (“Section

230(c)(2)(B)”) has provided a crucial legal foundation for the anti-threat
software industry. Section 230(c)(2)(B) provides a safe harbor for antithreat software vendors that protects their decision to classify software
and content as “threats.” In Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d
3

1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2009), this Court interpreted Section 230(c)(2)(B) to
give substantial deference to classification decisions by anti-threat
software vendors.
Because of the Zango ruling and the broad applicability of
Section 230(c)(2)(B), lawsuits over classification decisions have been
rare in the past decade. As this Court said in Zango, the policy of
“removing disincentives for the development of software that filters out
objectionable or inappropriate material[] is served by a safe harbor for
providers of malware-filtering software.” Zango, 568 F.3d at 1174. The
Zango ruling has successfully advanced that policy for the past decade.
The panel decision upends this legal foundation for the anti-threat
software industry. It empowers malefactors to challenge an adverse
classification decision as driven by anti-competitive animus, making
anti-threat software vendors defend their decisions in court or bend
their standards to avoid litigation. As anti-threat software vendors
respond to the chilling effects of threatened litigation, more illegitimate
software will reach businesses and consumers instead of being blocked.
Furthermore, the increased costs to document and defend their
classification decisions will be fatal to some anti-threat software
4

vendors, reducing consumer choice and counterproductively increasing
the market power—and costs borne by businesses and consumers—of
the few larger vendors who can survive.
B.

Carving Out Allegations of “Anti-Competitive Animus”
from Section 230(c)(2)(B) Benefits Rogue Software Vendors
At first blush, it might seem unusual for an anti-threat software

vendor to label any rival anti-threat software program as a “threat.”
Because the vendors are marketplace rivals (at least nominally),
intuitively any such negative classifications seem like they would be
due to anti-competitive animus.
In reality, there are many legitimate reasons for anti-threat
software vendors to make negative classifications of rivals.
First, well-known and well-regarded anti-threat software
programs sometimes do not adequately protect businesses and
consumers. For example, in 2016, Symantec’s well-known Norton AntiVirus program had critical security vulnerabilities that left its users
exposed. Symantec and Norton Security Products Contain Critical
Vulnerabilities, National Cyber Awareness System Alert (TA16-187A),
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), July 5, 2016,
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-187A. Separately, the well5

known McAfee “Security Suite” program has been labeled “crapware”
because it unexpectedly slows down users’ computers. Eric Griffith,
How to Rid a New PC of Crapware, PCMAG (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.pcmag.com/article/332543/how-to-rid-a-new-pc-of-crapware.
Although these software programs are from well-established providers,
they nevertheless may be “PUPs” to businesses and consumers. As a
result, rival anti-threat software programs might label them as threats
for legitimate—not anti-competitive—reasons.
Second, many programs that claim to be anti-threat software are
actually the opposite—they create threats for businesses and consumers
rather than provide protection from threats. There are many colloquial
labels for anti-threat software programs that themselves pose threats to
cybersecurity, including “scareware” and “fraudware.” We call these
programs “rogue software.”
Rogue software can expose businesses and consumers to
significant cybersecurity risks. Rogue software sometimes creates minor
annoyances, like slowing down a user’s computing device or displaying
annoying popup ads. Rogue software can fleece consumers by
demanding money to fix a problem that may not exist at all or that the
6

software program created itself. See generally Brett Stone-Gross et al.,
The Underground Economy of Fake Antivirus Software, June 1, 2011,
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7p07k0zr. In the worst cases, rogue
software can create huge and potentially life-changing problems, like
exfiltrating highly sensitive confidential data for criminal purposes.
There have been substantial litigation efforts to curb the abuses of
rogue software vendors. Some examples:
Enforcer
Federal Trade
Commission

Example Enforcements
 $163 million judgment against “scareware”
marketer1
 $35 million settlement with major retailer
Office Depot for offering a software program
that claimed to scan users’ computers for
viruses and other threats but, in fact, falsely
reported that their computers had “malware
symptoms” that could be “fixed” by paying for
additional services2

FTC Case Results in $163 Million Judgment Against “Scareware”
Marketer, Federal Trade Commission (Oct. 2, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/10/ftc-case-results163-million-judgment-against-scareware-marketer.
1

Office Depot and Tech Support Firm Will Pay $35 Million to Settle
FTC Allegations That They Tricked Consumers into Buying Costly
Computer Repair Services, Federal Trade Commission (Mar. 27, 2019),
2
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State Attorneys
General

 $1 million settlement for “marketing software
that falsely claimed computers were infected
with spyware, then enticing consumers to pay
for a program that claimed to remove it”3
 Defendants promoted their products by
“misrepresenting that a consumer’s computer
is at risk [and] installing software without the
computer user’s consent”4

Private
Plaintiffs

 Class action settlement for software that
“provided potential customers with a free
diagnostic scan designed ‘to misrepresent and
exaggerate the existence and severity of

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/03/office-depottech-support-firm-will-pay-35-million-settle-ftc.
Attorney General McKenna Announces $1 Million Settlement In
Washington’s First Spyware Suit, Washington State Attorney General
Press Release (Dec. 4, 2006), https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/newsreleases/attorney-general-mckenna-announces-1-million-settlementwashington-s-first.
3

Judge Finds Internet Affiliate Advertisers Violated Washington
Spyware Law, Washington State Attorney General Press Release (May
2, 2008), https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/judge-findsinternet-affiliate-advertisers-violated-washington-spyware-law.
4
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detected errors, as well as the overall status
of the PC’”5
As these cases suggest, government enforcement and private
litigation play a critical role in combating rogue software. However,
those enforcement efforts are insufficient to protect businesses and
consumers from these threats. Instead, businesses and consumers must
rely on anti-threat software vendors as their primary defense against
rogue software.
The panel decision undermines the ability of anti-threat software
vendors to perform their vital functions. Rogue software vendors will
regularly assert unsupportable claims that they are being negatively
classified because of anti-competitive animus, not because they
legitimately pose a threat to businesses and consumers. Without
Section 230(c)(2)(B) to protect their classification decisions, anti-threat
software vendors will spend more money defending their decisions. Or,
in the face of challenges to their classification decisions, anti-threat
software vendors will try to save money by avoiding a courtroom fight

Lagarde v. Support.com, Inc., No. C12-0609 JSC, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42725, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2013).
5
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and revising their classification. Neither outcome benefits businesses
and consumers, but these outcomes will be the inevitable result of the
panel decision—which allows rogue software programs to bypass the
Section 230(c)(2)(B) safe harbor simply by claiming to be a victim of
anti-competitive animus. Thus, the panel decision conflicts with the
policy considerations that Section 230(c)(2)(B) was designed to advance.
III. CONCLUSION
In Zango, this Court explained that “[r]ecourse to competition is
consistent with the statute’s express policy of relying on the market for
the development of interactive computer services.” Zango, 568 F.3d at
1177. Competition has the best chance of thriving if anti-threat
software vendors are free to do what they do best, without distortion
from unfounded claims of anti-competitive animus made by vendors of
rogue software.
The panel decision hampers anti-threat software vendors from
performing their core functions of protecting consumers and businesses
online. Because the ruling jeopardizes cybersecurity and makes all of us
less safe, the panel or the Court en banc should review its decision.
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